


Corporate Network Spying



Andrew Whitaker

Director of Enterprise InfoSec

InfoSec Academy / Training Camp

<http://www.infosecacademy.com> / <http://www.trainingcamp.com>

Who is this guy?

- Director of security course offerings for InfoSec Academy (division of Training Camp)
- Teaches ethical hacking / pentesting courses
- Co-author of Penetration Testing and Network Defense (Cisco Press, 2005)
- Author of other books/articles relating to security / networking
- Pentester of numerous financial and healthcare institutions
- M.Sc., Computer Science; CISSP, CEH, CCSP, CCNP, CCNA, CCDA, MCSE, CNE, A+, Network+, Security+, CTP, et al.

Training Camp

- InfoSec Academy division is world leader in teaching information security
 - Authorized CISSP
 - Certified Ethical Hacker
 - Licensed Penetration Tester
 - Sarbanes Oxley
 - HIPAA Compliance Training
 - Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA)
 - Much, much more...

What this is / What this is not

- **What this is**

- Training on corporate network spying
- Designed for those with beginner to intermediate skills

- **What this is not**

- Discussion of hot new exploit (which may only be theoretical or work in a lab environment)
- An overly technical discussion that only 1% of the techie world can understand

Agenda

- What the heck is this network spying thing?
- Who does it?
- Legal cases (to scare the bejeezes out of ya)
- How to get past those darn switches
- General tools of the trade: Windump / TCPdump, Ethereal
- Analyzing common protocols
 - FTP, MSN IM, Web, SMTP/POP
- Demos to make you druel

What is Network Spying?

- Wiretapping
- Targeted packet capturing

Who Spies on Networks?

- Legitimate: Law enforcement
 - FBI
 - NSA
- Legitimate: Corporations with consent
 - Admins
 - Your boss
- Illegitimate: The "bad" guys
 - Hacker hobbyists
 - Corporate espionage

Who Spies on Networks?

- Law Enforcement
 - Patent #5,937,422 "Semantic Forests"
 - NSA solution
 - Captures voice conversation
 - Automatic speech transcription
 - Carnivore
 - Abandoned in 2005
 - Part of DragonWare suite
 - Carnivore – packet capturing
 - Packeteer – reassembles packets
 - Coolminer – searching captured packets

Who Spies on Networks?

- Corporations
 - PC Magazine reported 77% of companies spy on employees
 - Typically e-mail and web surfing
 - Justifications:
 - To ensure employee productivity
 - To ensure company is void of illegal activity
 - To protect trade secrets

Who Spies on Networks?

- Hacker hobbyists
 - Hey, look Ma, a wireless network!
- Corporate espionage
 - Tech companies especially at risk
 - Example: Oracle & Microsoft

Legal and Ethical Considerations

- 4th Amendment
- 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
- Federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 2511)
- PATRIOT Act

Cases


- Katz vs. United States, 1967
- 2004 Nicodemo Scarfo ("Little Nicky")

What You Need To Begin

- Commercial: Network Forensics Analysis Tools (NFAT)
- Packet capturing tool
 - Open-source vs. commercial
 - General vs. targeted
 - remote-vs. local
 - switched vs. shared


Sniffing on Switched Networks

Hubs...mmm...good




Frame from UserA is always propagated to UserB & UserC

How Switches Work




How Switches Work



<u>MAC Table</u>	
FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	???
FA 0/3	???

User A sends a frame to user B.


How Switches Work



FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	???
FA0/3	???


Frame is duplicated out to UserB and UserC.

How Switches Work



FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	0BB0:0E44:2221 (USER B)
FA0/3	???

How Switches Work



FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	0BB0:0E44:2221 (USER B)
FA0/3	???


How To Get Around This Problem

- Five Solutions:
 1. ARP Poisoning method 1
 2. ARP Poisoning method 2
 3. MAC Duplicating
 4. MAC Flooding
 5. Port Mirroring

ARP Poisoning Method 1

- A.K.A. ARP spoofing
- Sending crafted replies to ARP requests


<u>MAC Table</u>	
FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	0BB0:0E44:2221 (USER B)
FA0/3	0BB0:0E44:2221 (spoofed)



ARP Poisoning Method 2

MAC Table

FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	0BB0:0E44:2221 (USER B)
FA0/3	0040:5B50:387E (spoofed)
Fa0/4	0040:5B50:387E (Router)



UserA
10.0.0.11


UserB
10.0.0.12

UserC
10.0.0.13

ARP Reply
Router
10.0.0.1


MAC Duplicating

- Used to target traffic sent to a single host (such as a server)
- ARP for a host you want to target to get its MAC address



MAC Flooding

- MAC addresses are stored in CAM table
- Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table
 - Switch must find an exact binary match
 - Information to do a lookup is called a key
 - Key is fed into a hashing algorithm to produce a pointer into the table




MAC Flooding

- CAM is limited on switches (typically 64k)
- If filled up, switch can no longer store new addresses
- Switch effectively turns into a hub

MAC Flooding

- MACOF (part of Dsniff)
- <http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/>

```
:c1:3b:50:d6:b8 fa:df:26:69:99:14 0.0.0.0.22550 > 0.0.0.0.48523: S 11596
97:95:82:1d:37:d0 7b:fa:dd:4c:75:61 0.0.0.0.38087 > 0.0.0.0.12386: S 53798
29:f8:c4:9:32:da ca:8d:f6:2:c8:87 0.0.0.0.59437 > 0.0.0.0.13066: S 1696046
d9:5a:ac:4f:ad:94 23:80:ac:8:a7:73 0.0.0.0.53446 > 0.0.0.0.33117: S 203989
b0:20:36:3:9c:fe 22:8d:59:45:3f:6b 0.0.0.0.14769 > 0.0.0.0.29914: S 144713
7a:27:a7:3:15:33 8a:7f:81:24:e1:bb 0.0.0.0.41373 > 0.0.0.0.8971: S 1279569
75:ef:8e:3:c5:26 f0:6b:e5:4c:d3:7b 0.0.0.0.35276 > 0.0.0.0.27444: S 197695
bc:f:bc:5d:60:87 49:67:a4:6c:f3:bf 0.0.0.0.49335 > 0.0.0.0.11344: S 889549
26:ad:2:49:fc:d3 53:e6:a0:3e:35:9a 0.0.0.0.25451 > 0.0.0.0.12668: S 187689
4e:cc:56:9:e2:75 a0:ca:cf:3b:7a:8e 0.0.0.0.61590 > 0.0.0.0.64385: S 121963
a8:1f:2a:31:89:79 f3:e6:7d:74:bf:a4 0.0.0.0.22720 > 0.0.0.0.31284: S 19906
26:14:ee:57:89:f0 4b:e9:4b:6c:8:11 0.0.0.0.28890 > 0.0.0.0.60969: S 492501
2e:ad:a6:20:96:ec e0:37:ba:31:45:d4 0.0.0.0.62754 > 0.0.0.0.60328: S 21825
bf:c1:fb:7d:a4:a7 6c:a1:50:59:2c:1b 0.0.0.0.59708 > 0.0.0.0.9508: S 219783
8a:18:34:e:82:1a bf:6d:68:66:56:7c 0.0.0.0.25036 > 0.0.0.0.7269: S 3417192
cd:7:50:8:e7:1a 33:fb:22:6a:b7:79 0.0.0.0.21768 > 0.0.0.0.25679: S 1771758
ad:72:d5:72:cc:b e2:9c:9c:36:3f:60 0.0.0.0.38008 > 0.0.0.0.4149: S 1831622
3:aF:9b:3b:96:26 c7:74:e5:2a:98:7b 0.0.0.0.48303 > 0.0.0.0.49658: S 808997953:808997953(0) win 512
bf:F9:46:4:e8:a5 63:3f:1c:4a:b6:7a 0.0.0.0.42767 > 0.0.0.0.24624: S 1622503690:1622503690(0) win 512
99:27:c9:54:5d:80 4d:6c:5a:
```



Port Mirroring

- Port mirroring is a legitimate method of mirroring one port to another port
- Cisco calls this *switched port analyzer* (SPAN)
 - Remote SPAN (RSPAN) can send traffic from one or more ports or an entire VLAN to another port on a different switch
 - There can be more than one source and more than one destination (up to 64 destination ports!)
- SPAN can copy traffic in one of three ways:
 - Rx SPAN
 - Tx SPAN
 - Rx/Tx SPAN

Port Mirroring

1) Specify source

```
monitor session session_number source  
  {interface interface-id | vlan vlan-id} [, |  
  -] [both | rx | tx]
```


2) Specify destination

```
monitor session session_number destination  
  {interface interface-id [, | -]  
  [encapsulation replicate]
```

Port Mirroring

```
Switch(config)#monitor session 1 source interface  
fastethernet 0/1 , 0/2 both
```

```
Switch(config)#monitor session 1 destination fastethernet  
0/3
```



Packet Capturing Software

- Tons!!!
- PacketStorm Security (<http://packetstormsecurity.org/sniffers/>) has almost 200 different sniffers
- Most popular freeware utilities:
 - Windump / Tcpdump
 - Ethereal (Now Wireshark)

Windump / TCPDump

- Developed by Loris Degioanni, Gianluca Varenni, Fulvio Rizzo, John Bruno, Piero Viano
- [Http://www.tcpdump.org](http://www.tcpdump.org) & <http://www.winpcap.org/windump/default.htm>
- Requires winpcap / libpcap library

Using WinDump / TCPDump

- `tcpdump [-ABdDeflLnNOpqRStuUvxX] [-c count]`

`[-C file_size] [-F file]`

`[-i interface] [-m module] [-M secret]`

`[-r file] [-s snaplen] [-T type] [-w file]`

`[-W filecount]`

`[-E spi@ipaddr algo:secret,...]`

`[-y datalinktype] [-Z user]`
`[expression]`

Using WinDump / tcpdump

- Display interfaces: windump -D
- Use interface: windump -i <interface # or identifier>
- Print out in Ascii: windump -A
- Log to file: windump -w *file.log*
- Read from log: windump -r *file.log*
- Verbose output: windump -vvv

Windump Example

```
23:23:52.991879 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 11231, offset 0, flags [DF], proto: TCP (6), length: 48)
    A152B.2436 > www.defcon.org.80: S, cksum 0x86d6 (correct), 916679930:916679930(0) win
    16384 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK>
```

```
E..0+.@.....
```

```
..9..(.      ..P6.l.....p.@.....
```

```
23:23:53.116681 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 47, id 35735, offset 0, flags [none], proto: TCP (6), length: 44)
    www.defcon.org.80 > A152B.2436: S, cksum 0x2304 (correct), 451321314:451321314(0) ack
    916679931 win 65535 <mss 1460>
```

```
E.,.../..]..(.
```

```
..9.P      .....6.l`...#.....
```

```
23:23:53.116738 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 11232, offset 0, flags [DF], proto: TCP (6), length: 40)
    A152B.2436 > www.defcon.org.80: ., cksum 0xf650 (correct), 1:1(0) ack 1 win 17520
```

```
E..(+.@.....
```

```
..9..(.      ..P6.l.....P.Dp.P..
```

```
23:23:53.117616 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 11233, offset 0, flags [DF], proto: TCP (6), length: 495)
    A152B.2436 > www.defcon.org.80: P 1:456(455) ack 1 win 17520
```

```
E...+.@....P
```

```
..9..(.      ..P6.l.....P.Dp1/..GET /html/defcon-14/html/dc-css/defconblue
```

Ethereal / Wireshark

- Packet analyzer
- Original author was Gerald Combs
- Now supported by over 100 programmers
- Can 'dissect' 759 protocols
- Linux & Windows friendly
- Now licensed through CACE Technologies

<http://www.wireshark.org/>

Ethereal / Wireshark

The screenshot shows the Wireshark interface with the following content:

```
GET SNMPV2-SMI::mib-2.25.3.2.1.5.1 SNMPV2-SMI::mib-2.25.3.5.1.1.1 SNMPV
Standard query A www.defcon.org
Standard query response A 216.231.40.180
Standard query A mirror.toolbar.netcraft.com
2552 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0 MSS=1460
Standard query response CNAME p.mii.instacontent.net A 64.191.208.114
2553 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0 MSS=1460
http > 2552 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460
2552 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=17520 Len=0
GET /html/defcon-14/html/dc-css/defconbluestyles.css HTTP/1.1
http > 2553 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 win=6144 Len=0 MSS=1460
2553 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=17520 Len=0
GET /check_url/http://www.defcon.org/3639027892 HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 302 Redirect (text/html)
```

Packet list details:

- Frame 2 (74 bytes on wire, 74 bytes captured)
- Ethernet II, Src: GemtekTe_5b:1e:c9 (00:90:4b:5b:1e:c9), Dst: Cisco_ca:b3:80 (00:0a:b7:ca:b3:80)
- Internet Protocol, Src: 10.3.3.57 (10.3.3.57), Dst: 10.10.10.1 (10.10.10.1)
- User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1314 (1314), Dst Port: domain (53)
- Domain Name System (query)


Hex data:

```
0000 00 0a b7 ca b3 80 00 90 4b 5b 1e c9 08 00 45 00  ....K[....E.
0010 00 3c 43 87 00 00 80 11 d5 e3 0a 03 03 39 0a 0a  .<C.....9..
0020 0a 01 05 22 00 35 00 28 42 ad 06 b2 01 00 00 01  ..".5.(B.....
0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77 06 64 65 66 63 6f  .....w ww.defco
0040 6e 03 6f 72 67 00 00 01 00 01                    n.org... ..
```

File: "C:\DOCUME~1\Andrew\LOCALS~1\Temp\etherXXXXLCBRCT" 6853 Bytes 00:00:06 | P: 31 D: 31 M: 0 Drops: 0

Ethereal / Wireshark

- To view entire conversation, right-click and choose **Follow TCP Stream**



Ethereal / Wireshark

The screenshot shows the 'Follow TCP stream' window in Wireshark. The window title is 'Follow TCP stream'. The main content area displays the following text:

```
Stream Content
GET /html/defcon-14/html/dc-css/defconbluestyles.css HTTP/1.1
Host: www.defcon.org
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (windows; U; windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.4) Gecko/20060508
Firefox/1.5.0.4
Accept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.defcon.org/
If-Modified-Since: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 16:31:58 GMT

HTTP/1.1 404 file does not exist
X-xxx:xxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Sun, 09 Jul 2006 04:15:41 GMT
Last-Modified: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 16:31:58 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

564
<!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en">
<html>
<head>

.<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
.<meta name="GENERATOR" content="vi">
.<meta name="Author" content="web master">
.<meta name="Description" content="html error 404 code">
.<meta name="keywords" content="html error 404 code">
.<meta name="copyright" content="Copyright . 1996-2004 by DatAmerica. All rights
reserved." />
.<meta name="robots" content="index, follow, noarchive" />
```

At the bottom of the window, there are several controls:

- Buttons: Save As, Print
- Text field: Entire conversation (2039 bytes)
- Dropdown menu: (empty)
- Radio buttons: ASCII, EBCDIC, Hex Dump, C Arrays, Raw
- Buttons: Filter out this stream, Close

Password Capturing

- The following protocols send passwords in plain text
 - Telnet
 - FTP
 - POP
 - SMTP
 - Just to name a few!
- Even if password is not in plain text, it is often easily cracked

Tool: Cain and Abel

- Developed by Massimiliano Montoro
- <http://www.oxid.it/index.html>
- Password recovery tool that supports packet capturing
- Can even capture & replay voice conversations

Cain and Abel

The screenshot displays the main interface of Cain and Abel. On the left, a tree view shows various protocols under the 'Passwords' category, including FTP, HTTP, IMAP, POP3 (2), SMB, Telnet, VNC, TDS, SMTP, NNTP, MSKerb5-PreAuth, Radius-Keys, Radius-Users, ICQ, IKE-PSK, MySQL, SNMP, and SIP. The main window shows a table of captured passwords. A black arrow points from the 'Client' column of the first two rows to a detailed view of the POP3 server data.

Timestamp	POP3 server	Client	Username	Password	AuthType	Hash	challenge	Dot
08/07/2006 - 23:51:17	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	victim14	defcon14	ClearText			
08/07/2006 - 23:51:18	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	victim14	defcon14	ClearText			

POP3 server	Client	Username	Password	AuthType
38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	victim14	defcon14	ClearText
38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	victim14	defcon14	ClearText

At the bottom of the interface, there are tabs for 'Hosts', 'APR', 'Routing', 'Passwords', and 'VoIP'. The 'Passwords' tab is currently selected. The status bar at the bottom left indicates 'Lost packets: 0%'.

Cain and Abel

The screenshot shows the main interface of Cain and Abel. The top menu bar includes File, View, Configure, Tools, and Help. Below the menu is a toolbar with various icons. The main window displays a table of captured data. A black arrow points to the 'AuthType' column. Below the main window, a detailed view of the captured data is shown, highlighting the 'AuthType' column.

SMB server	Client	Username	Domain	Password	AuthType	LM Hash	NT Hash	NT Serv-Chall	LM Cli-Chall	NT C
10.4.1.28	10.4.1.19	Administrator	TTC-Q...		NTLM Sessi...	C5F0A6B5806A8D05...	DC79B4CF118A...	87A2DED68D50...	000000000000...	55D

Username	Domain	Password	AuthType	LM Hash	NT Hash	NT Serv-Chall
Administrator	TTC-Q...		NTLM Sessi...	C5F0A6B5806A8D05...	DC79B4CF118A...	87A2DED68D50...

Cain and Abel

The screenshot shows the main interface of Cain and Abel. On the left is a tree view of protocols, with 'SMB (1)' selected. The main area is a table of captured passwords. A context menu is open over the first row, showing options: 'Send to Cracker', 'Send All to Cracker', 'Remove', 'Delete', and 'Remove All'. A large black arrow points from this menu to a larger, semi-transparent version of the same menu on the right side of the image.

SMB server	Client	Username	Domain	Password	AuthType	LM Hash	NT Hash	NT Serv-Chall	LM Cli-Chall	NT C
10.4.1.28	10.4.1.19	Administrator	TTC-D		NTLM Sessi...	C5F0A6B5806A8D05...	DC79B4CF118A...	87A2DED68D50...	000000000000...	55D

A larger, semi-transparent version of the context menu from the screenshot, showing the same options: 'Send to Cracker', 'Send All to Cracker', 'Remove', 'Delete', and 'Remove All'. It is positioned to the right of the main screenshot, with a large black arrow pointing from the menu in the screenshot to this one.

Cain and Abel

Telnet-20067935348859-1912 - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

=====
User Access Verification

=====
User Access Verification

Password:
welcome to the Defcon Router
Authorized access only
Defcon>

- ICQ (0)
- IKE-PSK (0)
- MySQL (0)
- SNMP (0)
- SIP (0)

Started	Close
08/07/2006 - 23:53:48	08/07

View

Remove Delete

Remove All

Sta
1.19

Telnet

Hosts APR Routing Passwords VoIP

Lost packets: 0%

Cain and Abel

The screenshot shows the main interface of Cain and Abel. On the left is a tree view of protocols, with 'HTTP (2)' selected. The main window displays a table of captured data. A black arrow points to the second row of the table.

Timestamp	HTTP server	Client	Username	Password	URL
09/07/2006 - 00:00:26	38.113.3.122	10.4.1.19	aWBgtLLqW-c6w5mCrX	defcon14	http://www.hotpop.com/login.jsp
09/07/2006 - 00:01:15	208.45.133.16	10.4.1.19	victim14	xxxxxxx	http://registration.excite.com/excitereg/login.jsp?ref=email&retu

Username	Password	URL
aWBgtLLqW-c6w5mCrX	defcon14	http://www.hotpop.com/login.jsp
victim14	xxxxxxxxxx	http://registration.excite.com/excitereg/login.jsp?ref=email&retu

This screenshot shows the network traffic filter settings. The 'Hosts' tab is active, and the filter is set to 'HTTP'. Below the filter settings, it indicates 'Lost packets: 0%'.

Cain and Abel

The screenshot shows the main interface of Cain and Abel. On the left, a tree view lists various protocols: FTP (1), HTTP (2), IMAP (0), POP3 (2), SMB (1), Telnet (1), VNC (0), TDS (0), SMTP (0), NNTP (0), MSKerberos-PreA, Radius-Keys (1), Radius-Users (1), ICQ (0), IKE-PSK, MySQL, SNMP (0), and SIP (0). The main window displays a table of captured passwords with the following data:

Timestamp	FTP server	Client	Username	Password
09/07/2006 - 00:04:20	207.46.236.102	10.4.1.19	anonymous	victim14@PunkAss.com


A black arrow points from the highlighted row in the main table to a magnified inset table below. The inset table shows the following data:

FTP server	Client	Username	Password
207.46.236.102	10.4.1.19	anonymous	victim14@PunkAss.com

Tool: Dsniff

- <http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/>
- Dsniff can be used to listen only for passwords

```
07/09/06 14:52:59 tcp 10.0.1.3.53364 -> 10.0.1.5.3 (pop)
USER defcon14
PASS 37337h@xor
```



Tool: Ettercap

- <http://ettercap.sourceforge.net/>
- Can be used to sniff passwords
- Active and passive capturing capabilities
- Content filtering

Tool: Ettercap



The screenshot shows the Ettercap NG-0.7.2 interface. The 'Host List' tab is active, displaying a table with the following data:

Host	Port	Host	Port	Proto	State	Bytes
10.0.1.5	3	10.0.1.3	53286	T	killed	510
10.0.1.3	53232		143	T	idle	123
10.0.1.3	53232		110	T	closed	252

GROUP 1 : ANY (all the hosts in the list)


GROUP 2 : ANY (all the hosts in the list)

Starting Unified sniffing...

POP : [REDACTED]:110 -> USER: quiksirr PASS: [REDACTED]

IMAP : [REDACTED]:143 -> USER: dcwilliams PASS: [REDACTED]

FTP : [REDACTED]:21 -> USER: dwilliams2 PASS: [REDACTED]



The screenshot shows the configuration details in the Ettercap interface, including the same text as the previous blocks:

GROUP 1 : ANY (all the hosts in the list)
GROUP 2 : ANY (all the hosts in the list)
Starting Unified sniffing...
POP : [REDACTED]:110 -> USER: quiksirr PASS: [REDACTED]
IMAP : [REDACTED]:143 -> USER: dcwilliams PASS: [REDACTED]
FTP : [REDACTED]:21 -> USER: dwilliams2 PASS: [REDACTED]

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

SMTP Commands

HELO	Used to initiate communication to an SMTP server
EHLO	Same as HELO
MAIL FROM:	Address you are sending e-mail from (easy to spoof!)
RCPT TO:	Destination of e-mail
SIZE=# of bytes	Not necessary. Specifies size of e-mail in bytes.
DATA	The message body. Terminated with a single period (.) on a line by itself.
QUIT	Terminates the SMTP session
VRFY <i>username</i>	Verify that a username is valid. Excellent way to enumerate users.
EXPN <i>name</i>	Like VRFY, can verify a username. EXPN can also list out all usernames in a distribution list.

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

- POP Commands (RFC 1225)
 - USER
 - PASS
 - QUIT
 - STAT
 - LIST
 - RETR
 - DELE
 - LAST
 - RSET

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

The screenshot shows the Ethereal network traffic analysis interface. The main pane displays a list of captured packets. Packet 8 is highlighted, showing a POP3 response. A large blue box is overlaid on the interface, displaying the raw data for this packet in a hex dump format. The hex dump shows the ASCII representation of the POP3 response, including the status '+OK', the user name 'victim14', and the sequence number '1819'. The status bar at the bottom indicates the file path and size: 'C:\DOCUMENTS\ADMINI~1\LOCAL5~1\Temp\etherXXXXT5ECT" 3478 Bytes 00:00:12'. The status bar also shows network statistics: 'P: 44 D: 44 M: 0 Drops: 0'.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	Cisco_ca:b3:8e	Spanning-tree-(for	STP	Conf. Root = 32778/00:0a:b7:ca:b3:80 Cost = 0 Port = 0x800
2	2.000935	Cisco_ca:b3:8e	Spanning-tree-(for	STP	Conf. Root = 32778/00:0a:b7:ca:b3:80 Cost = 0 Port = 0x800
3	2.269252	10.4.1.25	10.4.1.255	NBNS	Name query NB WORKGROUP<1b>
4	3.017846	10.4.1.25	10.4.1.255	NBNS	Name query NB WORKGROUP<1b>
5	3.134571	10.4.1.19	38.113.3.22	TCP	1819 > pop3 [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0 MSS=1460
6	3.177158	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	TCP	pop3 > 1819 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460
7	3.177213	10.4.1.19	38.113.3.22	TCP	1819 > pop3 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=64240 Len=0
8	3.214147	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	POP	Response: +OK
9	3.218106	10.4.1.19	38.113.3.22	POP	Request: USER victim14
10	3.253581	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	TCP	pop3 > 1819 [ACK] Seq=6 Ack=16 win=5840 Len=0
11	3.255319	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	POP	Response: +OK
12	3.255732	10.4.1.19	38.113.3.22	POP	Request: PASS defcon14
13	3.303600	38.113.3.22	10.4.1.19	POP	Response: +OK

```
Response: +OK
Request: USER victim14
pop3 > 1819 [ACK] seq=6 Ack
Response: +OK
Request: PASS defcon14
Response: +OK
Request: STAT
```

0020 01 13 00 6e 07 1b 76 bd 2e 74 70 c1 25 0e 50 18 ...n..v. .tp.%.P.
0030 16 d0 a1 73 00 00 2b 4f 4b 0d 0a 00 ...s...+O K...

File: "C:\DOCUMENTS\ADMINI~1\LOCAL5~1\Temp\etherXXXXT5ECT" 3478 Bytes 00:00:12 | P: 44 D: 44 M: 0 Drops: 0

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

The screenshot shows the Wireshark interface with a filter applied: `(ip.addr eq 38.113.3.22 and ip.addr eq 10.4.1.19) and (tcp.port eq 110 and`. The main packet list shows a sequence of 21 packets. The 'Follow TCP stream' window is open, displaying the following SMTP conversation:

```
+OK
USER victim14
+OK
PASS defcon14
+OK
STAT
+OK 0 0
+OK
QUIT
+OK
```

The 'Stream Content' pane on the left shows the raw data for the selected packet, including the SMTP headers and body. The bottom of the window shows the 'Save As' button, 'Print' button, and a dropdown menu set to 'Entire conversation (71 bytes)'. The encoding is set to 'ASCII'. The 'Filter out this stream' and 'Close' buttons are also visible.

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

The screenshot displays the Wireshark interface with a packet capture of SMTP traffic. The main pane shows a list of packets on the left and a detailed view of packet 7 on the right. The detailed view shows the SMTP protocol structure with commands and responses.

```
smtp > 1815 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0
1815 > smtp [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
Response: 220 smtp-2.hotpop.com ESMTP Postfix
Command: HELO TTCQ7VTFQEOBOC
smtp > 1815 [ACK] Seq=38 Ack=22 Win=5840 Len=0
Response: 250 smtp-2.hotpop.com
Command: MAIL FROM: <victim14@PunkAss.com>
Response: 250 ok
Command: RCPT TO: <attacker14@PunkAss.com>
smtp > 1815 [ACK] Seq=69 Ack=92 Win=5840 Len=0
Response: 250 ok
Command: DATA
smtp > 1815 [ACK] Seq=77 Ack=98 Win=5840 Len=0
Response: 354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
Message Body
Message Body
smtp > 1815 [ACK] Seq=114 Ack=1558 Win=8760 Len=0
```

Packet 7 details:

- Ethernet II, Src: Intel (08:00:27:00:00:00), Dst: Intel (08:00:27:00:00:00)
- Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.0.1, Dst: 10.0.0.2
- Transmission Control Protocol, Seq: 69, Win: 0, Len: 0
- SMTP, Seq: 69, Len: 0

Frame (frame), 62 bytes | P: 121 D: 28 M: 0 Drops: 0

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

Follow TCP stream

Stream Content

```
220 smtp-2.hot
HELO TTCQ7VTFQ
250 smtp-2.hot
MAIL FROM: <vi
250 ok
RCPT TO: <atta
250 ok
DATA
354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
Message-ID: <000b01c6a2ca$e5651ba0$1301040a@TTCQ7VTFQEBOBC>
From: "victim14" <victim14@PunkAss.com>
To: <attacker14@PunkAss.com>
Subject: Hi There!
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2006 16:12:53 -0400
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
    .boundary="-----_NextPart_000_0008_01C6A2A9.5E09A160"
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

-----_NextPart_000_0008_01C6A2A9.5E09A160
Content-Type: text/plain;
    .charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

The DefCon conference is coming up. Can we send some feds to it?

Sincerely,
Victim14@PunkAss.com
-----_NextPart_000_0008_01C6A2A9.5E09A160
Content-Type: text/html;
    .charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html"; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1">
<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2800.1276" name=3DGENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY bgcolor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The DefCon conference is coming =
up. When? Can we?
```

The DefCon conference is coming up. Can we send some feds to it?

The DefCon conference is coming up. Can we send some feds to it?

Sincerely,
Victim14@PunkAss.com


-----_NextPart_000_0008_01C6A2A9.5E09A160
Content-Type: text/html;
.charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html"; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1">
<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2800.1276" name=3DGENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY bgcolor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV>The DefCon conference is coming =
up. When? Can we?

Save As Print Entire conversation (1793 bytes) ASCII EBCDIC Hex Dump C Arrays Raw

Filter out this stream Close

Analysis of E-mail Traffic:Ettercap



Tool: Mailsnarf

- Part of Dsniff: <http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/>
- Dug Song
- Listens only for e-mail

Tool: Mailsnarf

```
root@1[ettercap]# mailsnarf  
mailsnarf: listening on eth0
```

```
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v752.2)  
To: David Williams  
Message-Id: <E7819150-0632-42A5-B70B-F447CF313500@trainingcamp.net>  
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-4-218664851  
From: David Williams  
Subject: Defcon 14 Mailsnarf  
Date: Sun, 9 Jul 2006 15:07:20 -0400  
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.752.2)
```

```
Testing Mail Snarf
```

```
David Williams  
Information Systems Support Specialist
```

```
Tech Train | The Training Camp | Infosec Academy  
Visit our website at http://www.trainingcamp.net
```

Analysis of FTP Traffic

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Help

Filter: + Expression... Clear Apply

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=3 TSV=394312420 TSER=0
2	0.014835	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [S
3	0.014990	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
4	0.015894	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [P
5	0.015998	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
6	0.139052	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [P
7	0.140186	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [P
8	0.140331	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
9	0.140771	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [P
10	0.147176	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [P
11	0.147335	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
12	0.147796	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [P
13	0.152160	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [P
14	0.152327	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A

Frame 6 (81 bytes on wire, 81 bytes captured)

- Ethernet II, Src: AppleCom_81:df:72 (00:0d:93:81:df:72), Dst: 3com_29:a2:b7 (00:07:09:29:a2:b7)
- Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.1.2 (10.0.1.2), Dst: 10.0.1.4 (10.0.1.4)
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 54890 (54890), Dst Port: compressnet (3)
- Data (15 bytes)

```
0000 00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 00 0d 93 81 df 72 08 00 45 00 ..Z)... .r..E.
0010 00 43 2a 5b 40 00 40 06 fa 54 0a 00 01 02 0a 00 .C*[@.@. .T.....
0020 01 04 d6 6a 00 03 86 b8 59 d0 84 2e 69 cb 80 18 ..j.... Y...i...
0030 af 58 e9 8e 00 00 01 01 08 0a 17 80 ba e5 00 00 .X.....
0040 20 45 55 53 45 52 20 64 65 66 63 6f 6e 31 34 0d EUSER d efcon14.
0050 0a
```

File: "/var/tmp/etherjtcH4lust" 3755 Bytes 00:00:00 P: 40 D: 40 M: 1 Drops: 0

Analysis of FTP Traffic

The screenshot displays the Wireshark interface with a packet capture of FTP traffic. The packet list pane shows several TCP segments between 10.0.1.2 and 10.0.1.4. Packet 7 is selected, and its details pane shows the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Data (37 bytes) sections. A blue box highlights the ASCII representation of the data, which is as follows:

```
.....r.. Z)....E.  
.Y.0@... .*.....  
.....j.. i...Y...  
..i..... ..F..  
..331 Pa ssword r  
equired for defc  
on14...
```

The hex dump pane below shows the raw data corresponding to the ASCII text:

```
0000 00 0d 93 81 df 72 00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 08 00 45 00 .....  
0010 00 59 1a 6f 40 00 80 06 ca 2a 0a 00 01 04 0a 00 .Y.0@... .*.....  
0020 01 02 00 03 d6 6a 84 2e 69 cb 86 b8 59 df 80 18 .....j.. i...Y...  
0030 ff f0 69 17 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 00 20 46 17 80 ..i..... ..F..  
0040 ba e5 33 33 31 20 50 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64 20 72 ..331 Pa ssword r  
0050 65 71 75 69 72 65 64 20 66 6f 72 20 64 65 66 63 equired for defc  
0060 6f 6e 31 34 2e 0d 0a on14...
```


Analysis of FTP Traffic

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Help

Filter:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [S
2	0.014835	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [S
3	0.014990	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
4	0.015894	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [F
5	0.015998	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [F
6	0.139052	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [F
7	0.140186	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [F
8	0.140331	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [F
9	0.140771	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [F
10	0.147176	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [F
11	0.147335	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [A
12	0.147796	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [F
13	0.152160	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890 [F
14	0.152327	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet [F

Frame 4 (93 bytes on wire, 93 bytes captured)

Ethernet II, Src: 3com_29:a2:b7 (00:10:5a:29:a2:b7), Dst: AppleCom_81:df:72 (00:0c:07:81:df:72)

Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.1.4 (10.0.1.4), Dst: 10.0.1.2 (10.0.1.2)

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: compressnet (3), Dst Port: 54890 (54890)

Data (27 bytes)

```
.....
0000 00 0d 93 81 df 72 00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 08 00 45 00  . . . . . r . . Z ) . . . . E .
0010 00 4f 1a 6e 40 00 80 06 ca 35 0a 00 01 04 0a 00  . 0 . n g . . . . . 5 . . . . .
0020 01 02 00 03 d6 6a 84 2e 69 b0 86 b8 59 d0 80 18  . . . . . j . . i . . Y . . . . .
0030 ff ff 2e 2c 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 00 20 45 17 80  . . . . . . . . . . . E . . . . .
0040 ba e4 32 32 30 20 4d 69 63 72 6f 73 6f 66 74 20  . . 220 M i c r o s o f t . . . . .
0050 46 54 50 20 53 65 72 76 69 63 65 0d 0a          F T P S e r v i c e . . . . .
```

File: "/var/tmp/etherjtcHy4lust" 3755 Bytes 00:00:00 P: 40 D: 40 M: 1 Drops: 0

Analysis

The image shows a Wireshark network traffic analysis interface. The top part displays a list of captured packets. The bottom part shows a detailed view of a selected packet (Frame 9), including its protocol stack and raw data. A blue box highlights the hex data of Frame 9, and a blue arrow points from the hex data to the packet list entry.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
2	0.014835	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compress
3	0.014990	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
4	0.015894	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compress
5	0.015998	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
6	0.139052	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
7	0.140186	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compress
8	0.140331	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
9	0.140771	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
10	0.147176	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compress
11	0.147335	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
12	0.147796	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >
13	0.152160	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compress
14	0.152327	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 >

Frame 9 (83 bytes on wire, 83 bytes captured)
Ethernet II, Src: AppleCom_81:df:72 (00:0d:93:81:df:72), Dst: 3com_29:a2:b7 (00:10:5a:29:a2:b7)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.1.2 (10.0.1.2), Dst: 10.0.1.4 (10.0.1.4)
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 54890 (54890), Dst Port: compressnet (3), Seq: 16, Ack: 65, Len: 17
Data (17 bytes)

```
0000 00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 00 0d 93 81 df 72 08 00 45 00  ..Z)... ..r..E.  
0010 00 45 2a 5d 40 00 40 06 fa 50 0a 00 01 02 0a 00  .E*]@.@. .P.....  
0020 01 04 d6 6a 00 03 86 b8 59 df 84 2e 69 f0 80 18  ...j.... Y...i...  
0030 af 58 8e 86 00 00 01 01 08 0a 17 80 ba e5 00 00  .X.....  
0040 20 46 50 41 53 53 20 33 37 33 33 37 68 40 78 6f  FPASS 3 7337h@xo  
0050 72 0d 0a                                     r..
```

Analysis of FTP Traffic

The image shows a Wireshark capture of FTP traffic. The main pane displays a list of packets, with packet 10 selected. The packet details pane shows the structure of the selected packet: Ethernet II, Internet Protocol, and Transmission Control Protocol. The data pane shows the raw bytes of the packet, which is a directory listing response from the server. A blue box highlights the ASCII representation of the data, and a blue arrow points from the box to the corresponding hex and ASCII bytes in the data pane.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
2	0.014835	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890
3	0.014990	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
4	0.015894	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890
5	0.015998	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
6	0.139052	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
7	0.140186	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890
8	0.140331	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
9	0.140771	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
10	0.147176	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890
11	0.147335	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
12	0.147796	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet
13	0.152160	10.0.1.4	10.0.1.2	TCP	compressnet > 54890
14	0.152327	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.4	TCP	54890 > compressnet

```
.....r.. Z)..E.  
..R.p0... .0.....  
.....j.. i...Y...  
..K/..... ..F..  
..230 Us er defco  
n14 logg ed in...
```

0000 00 0d 93 81 df 72 00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 08 00 45 00r.. Z)..E.
0010 00 52 1a 70 40 00 80 06 ca 30 0a 00 01 04 0a 00 ..R.p0... .0.....
0020 01 02 00 03 d6 6a 84 2e 69 f0 86 b8 59 f0 80 18j.. i...Y...
0030 ff df 4b 2f 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 00 20 46 17 80 ..K/..... ..F..
0040 ba e5 32 33 30 20 55 73 65 72 20 64 65 66 63 6f ..230 Us er defco
0050 6e 31 34 20 6c 6f 67 67 65 64 20 69 6e 2e 0d 0a n14 logg ed in...

Analysis of FTP Traffic

Mark Packet (toggle)

Time Reference

Apply as Filter

Prepare a Filter

Follow TCP Stream

Decode As...

Print...

Show Packet in New Window

Etherreal



Session... Clear Apply

```
Ack=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=3 TSV=394312420 TSER=0
eq=0 Ack=1 Win=16384 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=0 TSV=0 TSER=0
Ack=1 Win=359104 Len=0 TSV=394312420 TSER=0
eq=1 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=27 TSV=8261 TSER=394312420
Ack=28 Win=359072 Len=0 TSV=394312420 TSER=8261
eq=1 Ack=28 Win=359104 Len=15 TSV=394312421 TSER=8261
eq=28 Ack=16 Win=65520 Len=37 TSV=8262 TSER=394312421
Ack=65 Win=359064 Len=0 TSV=394312421 TSER=8262
eq=16 Ack=65 Win=359104 Len=17 TSV=394312421 TSER=8262
eq=65 Ack=33 Win=65503 Len=30 TSV=8262 TSER=394312421
Ack=95 Win=359072 Len=0 TSV=394312421 TSER=8262
eq=33 Ack=95 Win=359104 Len=6 TSV=394312421 TSER=8262
[H, ACK] Seq=95 Ack=39 Win=65497 Len=16 TSV=8262 TSER=394312421
[X] Seq=39 Ack=111 Win=359088 Len=0 TSV=394312421 TSER=8262
```

Window

```
> Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.1.2 (10.0.1.2), Dst: 10.0.1.4 (10.0.1.4)
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 54890 (54890), Dst Port: compressnet (3), Seq: 0, Ack: 0, Len: 0
```

```
0000 00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 00 0d 93 81 df 72 08 00 45 00 ..Z).... ..f..E.
0010 00 3c 2a 58 40 00 40 06 fa 5e 0a 00 01 02 0a 00 .<*X@.@. .^.....
0020 01 04 d6 6a 00 03 86 b8 59 cf 00 00 00 00 a0 02 ...j.... Y.....
0030 ff ff ab a5 00 00 02 04 05 b4 01 03 03 03 01 01 .....
0040 08 0a 17 80 ba e4 00 00 00 00 .....
```

File: "/var/tmp/etherj:ChY4lust" 3755 Bytes 00:00:00

P: 40 D: 40 M: 1 Drops: 0


Analysis of FTP Traffic

```
Stream Content:
220 Microsoft FTP Service
USER defcon14
331 Password required for defcon14.
PASS 37337h@xor
230 User defcon14 logged in.
SYST
215 Windows_NT
MACB ENABLE
500 'MACB ENABL
PWD
257 "/" is cur
FEAT
211 -FEAT
    SIZE
    HDTH
211 END
PASV
227 Entering P
LIST
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
226 Transfer complete.
```

Save As Print Entire conversation (419 bytes) [Dropdown] ASCII EBCDIC Hex Dump C Arrays Raw

Filter out this stream Close

Analysis Of FTP Traffic: Ettercap



The screenshot displays the Ettercap NG-0.7.2 interface. The main window shows a terminal-like output of FTP traffic. The output includes the following lines:

```
220 ttcftp Microsoft FTP Service (Version 5.0)..  
331 Password required for seaport..  
230-Training Camp's FTP in Bushkill, PA. All Unauthorized access is p  
rohibited!.  
230 User ██████████ logged in..  
215 Windows_NT version 5.0.  
500 'MACB ENABLE': command not understood.  
257 "/" is current directory..  
500 'FEAT': command not understood.  
227 Entering Passive Mode (██████████,76)..  
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting..  
226 Transfer complete..
```

Below the terminal output, there is a control panel with four buttons: "Join Views", "Inject Data", "Inject File", and "Kill Connection". At the bottom of the interface, a status bar shows the current connection details: "FTP : 216.113.232.131:21 -> USER ██████████ PASS: ██████████".

Analysis of FTP Traffic: Ettercap

The screenshot shows the Ettercap NG-0.7.2 interface. The main window displays a directory listing of an FTP server. A text box highlights the first few lines of the listing, which are: 'd----- 1 owner group 0 Jun 22 12:33 images.', 'd----- 1 owner group 0 Mar 17 14:26 Instruct', and 'ors.'. Below this, the listing continues with 'd----- 1 owner group 0 Sep 6 2004 Java.', '----- 1 owner group 17072239 Apr 7 2005 kernel-', and '2.6.10-1.770.EC3.i686.rpm'. The interface also shows a menu bar with options like Start, Targets, Hosts, View, Mitm, Filters, Logging, Plugins, and Help. At the bottom, there are buttons for 'Join Views', 'Inject Data', 'Inject File', and 'Kill Connection'.

Shows directory listing of FTP server

```
d----- 1 owner group 0 Jun 22 12:33 images.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Mar 17 14:26 Instruct  
ors.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Sep 6 2004 Java.  
----- 1 owner group 17072239 Apr 7 2005 kernel-  
2.6.10-1.770.EC3.i686.rpm  
  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Feb 26 2004 New Trai  
ner Kits.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Apr 22 2004 Novell.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Apr 18 2005 Oracle.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Mar 3 13:33 Programs  
-Utilities.  
dr-xr-xr-x 1 owner group 0 Jun 23 13:43 Public.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 May 15 20:53 Rick.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Jun 14 9:17 Solaris.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Aug 10 2004 Test Mat  
erials.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 May 17 22:31 TestSit  
e Installation.  
d----- 1 owner group 0 Jun 19 12:07 Upload.  
----- 1 owner group 2925 May 4 12:07 upload.a  
sp.
```

Analysis of MS

Victim14@PunkAss.com: "We need to send feds to the Defcon conference. Hackers are bad...very bad."

Stream Content

```
TypingUser: victim14@punkass.com  
MSG 14 N 198  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8  
X-MMS-IM-Format: FN=MS%20shell%20dlg; EF=; CO=0; CS=0; PF=0  
We need to send feds to the Defcon conference. Hackers are bad...very bad.  
attacker14@punk  
MIME-Version: 1  
Content-Type: t  
TypingUser: att  
MSG attacker14@  
MIME-Version: 1  
Content-Type: t  
TypingUser: att  
MSG attacker14@  
MIME-Version: 1  
Content-Type: t  
TypingUser: attacker14@punkass.com  
MSG attacker14@punkass.com attacker14@  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8  
X-MMS-IM-Format: FN=MS%20shell%20dlg; EF=; CO=0; CS=0; PF=0  
No, there is no need to send a fed...i am sure nobody will do anything illegal there
```

Save As | Print | Entire conversation (38311 bytes) | ASCII | EBCDIC | Hex Dump | C Arrays | Raw

Filter out this stream | Close


File: "C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\etherXXX47HFC1" 79 KB 00:00:44 | P: 186 D: 83 M: 0 Drops: 0

Attacker14@PunkAss.com: "No, there is no need to send a fed...I am sure nobody will do anything illegal there."

Analysis of MSN Messenger Traffic

- MSN Sniffer
- www.ffetech.com
- Also have ICQ Sniffer, AIM Sniffer, HTTP Sniffer, ACE Password Sniffer, and much more

Analysis of MSN Messenger Traffic



#1, 2006-7-8 16:30:28

attacker14@punkass.com (attacker14@punkass.com) says:

No, you have nothing to worry about. Where do you live again?

#0, 2006-7-8 16:30:16

victim14@punkass.com (victim14@PunkAss.com) says:

Is it it ok to leave my wireless open? You don't think anyone will use it, do you?

Capturing..

Buffer Usage: 16 KB

Conversations: 1

Web Traffic:URLSnarf

- Part of dsniff, written by Dug Song
- <http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/>
- `urlsnarf [-n] [-i interface] [[-v] pattern [expression]]`
 - n Do not resolve IP to hostname
 - i Interface
 - v "versus mode" Invert the pattern you are matching
 - pattern Specify regular expression to match
 - Expression Specify a tcpdump filter expression to select traffic to dump

Web Traffic: URLSnarf

```
Shell - Konsole
Session Edit View Bookmarks Settings Help

root@[ettercap]# urlsnarf
urlsnarf: listening on eth0 [tcp port 80 or port 8080 or port 3128]
10.0.1.3 - - [09/Jul/2006:15:09:32 -0400] "GET http://www.apple.com/ HTTP/1.1" - - "-" "Mozilla/5.0
(Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/418.8 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3"
10.0.1.3 - - [09/Jul/2006:15:09:33 -0400] "GET http://www.apple.com/main/css/global.css HTTP/1.1" - -
"http://www.apple.com/" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/418.8 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Safari/419.3"
10.0.1.3 - - [09/Jul/2006:15:09:49 -0400] "GET http://images.apple.com/t/2006/us/en/i/7.gif HTTP/1.
1" - - "http://www.apple.com/" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/418.8 (KHT
ML, like Gecko) Safari/419.3"
10.0.1.3 - - [09/Jul/2006:15:09:49 -0400] "GET http://images.apple.com/t/2006/us/en/i/1.12g.gif HTT
P/1.1" - - "http://www.apple.com/" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en) AppleWebKit/418.8
```

Tool: Ettercap

The screenshot displays the Ettercap NG-0.7.2 interface. The main window shows a network capture with a selected packet. The packet's raw data is displayed in a hex editor, and the corresponding ASCII data is shown below it. The ASCII data is a web page snippet that has been injected into the network traffic. The injected content includes HTML tags for background color and font face, and a message in bold text: "Sorry, I couldn't find any matching listings for \"Testing Def con\" in East Stroudsburg, PA 18301. To start a new search, just enter the search term or \"cl\" to change your location." The interface also shows various control buttons like "Inject File", "Kill Connection", "Join Views", and "Inject Data". At the bottom, there is a log showing DHCP traffic: "DHCP: [00:0A:95:DA:F9:3C] REQUEST 10.0.1.3" and "DHCP: [10.0.1.1] ACK : 10.0.1.3 255.255.255.0 GW 10.0.1.1 DNS 10.0.1.1 \"cmts.sth.ptd.net\"".

ettercap NG-0.7.2

Start Targets Hosts View Mitm Filters Logging Plugins Help

Host List x Connections x Connection data x

```
>.....D.(m*..7.....
1.....`SP.R....Y.....D.E4....text/aolrtf;
charset="us-ascii"....<html><body bgcolor="#ffffff"><font lang="0">
on the shitty computer<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.</fon
t></body></html>.
..D.....text/aolrtf; charset="us-ascii"....<html><body bgcolor="#
ffffff"><font lang="0">down in scranton<br>.<br>.<br>.momma is buyi
ng stuff for my condo!! </font></body></html>.....D.Eq*..8.P.....J
s.....AOLYellowPages.....$.D.....H#.....
a.....<font face="Times new roman" size="
2">Sorry, I couldn't find any matching listings for <b>"Testing Def
con"</b> in East Stroudsburg, PA 18301. To start a new search, jus
t enter the search term or "<b>cl</b>" to change your location.
```

Inject File Kill Connection

Join Views Inject Data Inject File Kill Connection

DHCP: [00:0A:95:DA:F9:3C] REQUEST 10.0.1.3
DHCP: [10.0.1.1] ACK : 10.0.1.3 255.255.255.0 GW 10.0.1.1 DNS 10.0.1.1 "cmts.sth.ptd.net"

Countermeasures

- Port Security
- IPSec

Demo Time

